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caused harm to environmental resources. While the benefits of bonds have been developed, there has been
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hazard, liquidity constraints, and legal restrictions. Each limit offers a challenge to the success of
environmental bonds. We explore the use of bonds to resolve agricultural nonpoint source pollution problems
as a motivating example. We also consider how other incentive schemes suggested by the labor literature
might prove useful in the context of environmental management. Specifically, we consider the labor
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ABSTRACT 
Bonds have recently been promoted as an alternative tool for controlling environmental 
damages. particularly in those instances when the innovative activities of a firm have uncertain future 
impacts [Costanza and Perrings (1990)]. Under this mechanism, a firm would post a bond ex ante, 
forfeiting the bond if its activities caused harm to environmental resources. While the benefits of 
bonds have been developed, there has been little systematic effort to explore their limitations. The 
labor literature, on the other hand, has extensively studied the limits of bonds as a mechanism for 
preventing worker shirking. Using the insights found for this parallel problem, this paper explores the 
limits to environmental bonds, focusing on the problems of moral hazard, liquidity constraints, and 
legal restrictions. Each limit offers a challenge to the success of environmental bonds. We explore 
the use of bonds to resolve agricultural nonpoint source pollution problems as a motivating example. 
We also consider how other incentive schemes suggested by the labor literature might prove useful in 
the context of environmental management. Specifically, we consider the labor mechanisms of 
efficiency wages, increasing wage profiles, trusts funds. and rank-order tournaments. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this situation: You hire Ole to work around your yard for $2.00 per hour. At this 
wage and given his disutility from expending effort, Ole has an incentive to shirk on the job. He 
would prefer wasting time doing unproductive activities like sleeping under a tree because you cannot 
perfectly monitor his actions. The worst that can happen is that he gets fired and has to fmd new 
employment at this low wage. The question you must answer is how can you discipline Ole to 
prevent shirking. What incentive schemes will increase Ole's costs of malfeasance? 
The same basic question underlies the problem of pollution control and environmental 
enforcement Despite legal standards for ambient pollution concentrations, a firm has an incentive to 
shirk on pollution control given its profits derive from a market price that does not reflect social 
preferences for environmental quality. The regulator's question is how to induce the firm to not shirk 
on pollution control when behavior is imperfectly monitored. What incentive scheme will eliminate 
the incentive to shirk? 
One suggested solution for both labor and environmental problems is that of an assurance 
bonding system [see Becker and Stigler (1974), Bohm and Russell (1985), and Perrings (1989)]. A 
bond is a direct mechanism to induce socially desirable incentives in both workers and firms. In the 
labor example, Ole would post a bond prior to employment, and then would forfeit the bond if he 
were caught shirking. The bond increases the costs of shirking, thereby reducing the incentive for 
malfeasance. The same principle is proposed for environmental control. A firm posts a bond that will 
be forfeited if pollution control is inadequate. 
Yet the question remains as to why bonds are the exception rather than the rule. With few 
exceptions, even in the labor market, bonds are rarely used [see Carmichael (1989) and Dickens eta/. 
(1989)]. Because the labor market is relatively more complete and efficient, why should we expect 
bonds to be any easier to implement for large-scale, long-term environmental problems? The point is 
that we should not. Although bonds have been proposed and implemented in the form of deposit-
refund systems [see Balun (1981)], there are limitations to bonds as a solution to any problem of 
undesirable incentives, and broad environmental problems are no exception. Since the labor literature 
has identified several key limitations to bonding, our goal is to determine how these limits relate to 
environmental issues. We employ the lessons learned over the past two decades by researchers in the 
field of labor economics to consider when bonds may or may not be practical and how bonds can be 
augmented with other incentive devices for a more effective mechanism to reduce shirking in the 
environmental workplace. 
First. we begin by reviewing the identified benefits of environmental bonds. We briefly 
consider three of the advantages described in Balun (1981) and Perrings (1989): (a) efficiency, (b) 
value registration, and (c) research incentive. Costanza and Perrings (1990) also argue that environ-
mental bonds have benefits beyond reducing shirking. Specifically, it is argued that bonds further 
encourage the firms to provide information to the regulator by shifting the "burden of proof' of 
environmental damage from the government to the finn. 
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Second, we describe the limits to bonding as identified in the labor literature and discuss how 
they relate to environmental issues. We focus on three key limitations: government moral hazard, 
liquidity constraints, and legal restrictions on contracting. Government moral hazard exists when the 
government has an incentive to falsely claim that the firm is shirking, thereby acquiring the value of 
the bond. Liquidity constraints exist when a firm is forced to post a bond ex ante, thereby restricting 
entry into the industry since not all firms can acquire the capital necessary for the bond. Imperfect 
contract enforcement can affect bond performance for a variety of reasons including illegalities. 
formation defenses. performance excuses, and the inability of the enforcer to do the job. All three 
limitations offer a challenge to the successful implementation of bonds for environmental management. 
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Third, to illustrate the potential difficulties with envirorunental bonds, we explore their use in 
reducing nonpoint source pollution from agricultural production. Since the significant increases in 
agricultural production are due in part to the introduction and expanded use of agri-chemicals such as 
pesticides and fertilizers. this sector provides a useful example. We conclude that the major difficulty 
with bonds is the liquidity constraints of farmers. These constraints will be binding given the thinness 
of the insurance market and the fact that debt-to-equity ratios are already high in this sector. 
Fourth, we identify other incentive devices suggested by the labor literature to reduce the 
incentive for shirking. Specifically, we examine the labor concepts of efficiency wages, increasing 
wage profiles, trust funds, and rank-order tournaments. If solutions can be found to reduce the 
potential limits to bonds, then we will have increased confidence that bonds can become a useful 
policy tool for global envirorunental management Finally, we offer our conclusions. 
2. ADVANTAGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS 
Bonds have been suggested as an instrument to control the external effects from pollution and 
resource depletion [e.g., Bohm (1981), Bohm and Russell (1985), Perrings (1989), and Costanza and 
Perrings (1990)]. Environmental bonds originate from the material user fees proposed by Solow 
(1971) and Mills (1972) where a private entity is required to post a bond covering any potential 
environmental damages. The goal is for the finn to internalize perceived social costs into its private 
resource allocation decisions. The value of the bond would be a function of the envirorunental 
authority's best estimate of the worst outcome of any specified activity given the current state of 
knowledge.' The bond value would change over time to reflect both practical experience and the 
results of theoretical and experimental research into innovative activities. Bonds would also insure 
'Perrings (1989, p. 99) refers to this worst outcome as the "focus loss" of an activity, 
" ... describing the least unbelievable conjectural cost." 
that the funds exist to indemnify society against the future environmental costs of current activities, 
with these funding increasing in proportion to the perceived risks. Given uncertain damages. 
environmental bonds may be an attractive alternative to Pigouvian taxes and quantity constraints. 
Perrings (1989, p. 101) suggests a number of advantages to environmental bonds. We focus 
on three of these: (a) efficiency and the incentive to shirk; (b) value registration, revealing the value 
placed on the potential damages from the proposed project by the environmental authority; and 
(c) research incentives and shifting the burden of proof. 
2.1. Efficiency and the Incentive to Shirk 
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Consider the simple analytics of the use of bonds to reduce incentives to shirk. Becker and 
Stigler (1974) demonstrate that with perfect monitoring the value of the bond, B, should equal or 
exceed the value of disutility of effort. v. With imperfect monitoring, the value of the bond must 
reflect both the value of shirking plus the probability of detection. p, such that pB ~ v 2 Any 
combination of the detection probability and magnitude of the bond should yield the desired result. 
Therefore, since monitoring expends real resources while posting the bond does not. the seemingly 
efficient strategy is to reduce the detection probability as low as possible while increasing the value of 
the bonds as high as possible. This is a classic economic solution to shirking: "hang tax evaders with 
probability zero" [Kolm (1973)]. 
Although an infinitesimal detection probability and an infinite bond are unlikely for several 
reasons outlined in the next section, the message is clear: a firm that requires a worker to post a bond 
imposes an actual cost for shirking. The worker must take this cost into account when deciding 
whether or not to shirk while on the job. The result is that the worker will provide the effort that the 
firm desires. 
2See Parsons (1986. pp. 806-807) for additional discussion. 
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The application of bonds to the environment reflects an identical objective: a government 
agency requires the finn to post a bond so that any malfeasance will result in the loss of the bond. 
Firms will now internalize their impacts on social welfare that are unaccounted for in the market price 
in order to ensure recovery of their bond. There is an increased incentive to provide a socially optimal 
level of pollution control or safety precautions, given the positive cost for shirking [also see Bohm and 
Russell (1985)]. 
2.2. Value Registration 
Perrings ( 1989) identifies a series of benefits not addressed in the labor literature. For 
example, posting the bond would require an explicit registration of the value of potential environ-
mental costs of an activity, opening the issue to public debate and scrutiny. This value registration 
could then act as a benchmarlc to guide the environmental costs of future innovative activities. Of 
course, determining the value of the bond will be a difficult task. If the benefit of bonds is to avoid 
events of which we are completely ignorant of the damages, then it will challenge researchers in both 
nonmarket valuation and natural resource accounting. If the value of the bond is unclear. then the 
firm has significant incentive to play an active role in the process. The finn would find it in its 
interest to invest resources into either direct research or lobbying activities or both to get the value as 
low as possible. Explicit value registration will be a confrontation activity. 
2.3. Research Incentive and Shifting the Burden of Proof 
The value of the bond is detennined by the potential environmental impact of the firm's 
activity. If a finn can prove the cost of environmental damages of an activity is less than the cost of 
their posted bond, then the value of the bond can be reduced. Therefore, Perrings (1989) argues that 
the finn has an incentive to invest resources in R&D to discover the true value of environmental 
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damages or increase the use of inputs that are more benign to the environment.' This incentive is 
enhanced, according to Costanza and Perrings (1990). by the implied shift in the burden of proof from 
the public to the firm. Instead of taking the firm to court to prove that the firm was liable for 
damages. now the firm must prove that no environmental effects occurred. Otherwise. the bond would 
be forfeited. This not only discourages the firm from shirking, but also encourages it to keep and 
provide records and to conduct research that would establish the firm's innocence. However, while 
there are benefits to the additional research and information, it is arguable as to whether this shift in 
the burden of proof represents an optimal risk sharing strategy. Individual firms are generally viewed 
as more risk averse than the government, or society as a whole. Shifting the burden of proof from the 
public to the firm represents a shifting of risk towards a more risk averse segment. rather than away 
from it. 
2.4. Other Advantages 
A number of additional benefits have been attributed to bonds in either the labor or environ-
mental literature. Perrings (1989), for example. argues for the flexibility of the bonding approach. 
Specifically, since the bond's value can be adjusted over time, it can reflect increased knowledge about 
the potential damages from a firm's activity, or diminish as the passage of time proves some of the 
feared damages to be unfounded. Bohm and Russell (1985) note that bonds also provide firms with an 
alternative to the production delays that normally result from lengthy governmental testing require-
ments. By posting a bond, the firm could proceed with its activity. while essentially guaranteeing the 
outcome of the government tests. Bonds may also be used, as in the labor arena. to reduce turnover. 
or at least the impact of turnover. Firms leaving an environmentally sensitive industry would not have 
access to their posted bonds immediately, but would have to wait until the feared damages from their 
'However, as noted by Perrings (1989, p. 104}, " ... environmental research suffers acutely from 
the problem of moral hazard .... In other words, privately funded research would tend to downplay 
, the environmental costs of innovative activity." 
past activities were either proved unfounded or were covered by the bond. This provides an incentive 
for firms (and their legal successors) to continue to monitor and control the impacts of their past 
activities, even after leaving an industry. Finally, bonds may appeal in the political arena, since 
deposit systems for recyclable resources have proven effective throughout the world. 
In addition to the basic research incentives provided by bonds (i.e., by reducing the damages 
associated with an activity, or by proving that fears of such damages are unfounded, the firm may 
recover the bond early), Perrings (1989, p. 101) argues that a second research benefit exists. "Since 
the bond would yield interest income, it would generate public research funds in direct proportion to 
the public concern about the future effects of innovative activities." The problem with this approach. 
however, is that the bond has been posted as a guarantee, to be returned in full to the firm if damages 
do not in fact occur. By skimming a portion of the bond's interest earnings to fund public research, 
the firm is being punished ex ante for participating in innovative activities, since a portion of its 
wealth stream is lost regardless of the future state of the world. The skimming of interest for public 
research funds reduces the rate of return the firm receives on its bond, presumably below its alterna-
tives in the market place and discouraging investment in this sector. The problem here is similar to 
the moral hazard problem discussed in section 3 below. In this case, rather than falsely claiming 
malfeasance and the bond itself, the government would be claiming a portion of its income earning 
potential with no evidence, or even claim, of malfeasance. 
3. IF BONDS ARE SO DESIRABLE, THEN WHY ARE THEY SO RARE? 
Despite the numerous advantages claimed for bonds or entrance fees, there are few examples 
of their use in the real world, either for labor [Carmichael (1989). Dickens eta/. (1989)] or environ-
mental management [Bohm (1981)]. Their limited use has been attributed in large part to three 
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disadvantages discussed extensively in the labor context: (a) moral hazard. (b) liquidity constraints, 
and (c) legal restrictions on contracts. 
3.1. Moral Hazard 
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In the labor literature, a major limit to bonding is the fear of firm moral hazard. Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984) argue that the firm has an incentive to capture the worker's bond by simply stating that 
the worker has shirked. The worker would then be left with the option of challenging the finn or 
fmding new employment. Because legal action is costly, the worker may simply search for new 
employment Therefore, unless there is a third party impartial to the proceedings, the worker will have 
no incentive to work for a firm whose trustworthiness is uncertain [see Carmichael (1985)]. 
From the public choice viewpoint in the case of environmental bonds, there would be a similar 
potential for government moral hazard [see Buchanan and Tullock (1975)]. If regulators are interested 
in maximizing their own private welfare rather than social welfare, then there is a nontrival likelihood 
that the government could label the firm as a shirker, thereby confiscating the value of the bond. The 
government is the sole seller of bonds, and the firm has no choice but to either post the bond or not 
go into business in that country. Firms who want to do business in a country face the risk that the 
govenunent will unjustifiably take the bond. Appeals to third parties may be ineffective, at best, given 
the lack of an effective international court. 
For example, Rich (1985) notes that the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 creates liability without cause. In the case of the United 
States vs. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc .• the government argued that CERCLA did not 
require proof that a substance found on a site had been released or threatens to be released from the 
defendant. Liability is attached to the mere presence of the substance at the site from which other 
substances were released. These liability rules would create such significant uncertainty with firms 
that the government could fmd the firm shirking and confiscate the bond. 
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Another argument for firm moral hazard is Niskanen's (1971) theory of the bureaucracy. The 
theory argues that bureaucrats obtain more wealth and power through the expansion of the size and 
scope of their agencies, achieved by maximizing the agency's budget. If the objective is to maximize 
the budget, then the agency has a strong incentive to claim the firm has shirked. Once the bond is 
collected, the agency can use the funds to promote even more stringent environmental controls, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that more firms will violate environmental standards and will lose 
their bond. 
Mitigating this moral hazard problem is the impact that false bond claims would have on the 
reputation of the principal in this principal-agent relationship. In the labor literature, cheating imposes 
a future cost on the firm, as its diminished reputation requires it to pay higher wages [Becker and 
Stigler (1974)). Likewise, cheating on the part of the government would reduce social welfare by 
discouraging innovative activity, requiring an increased rate of return in the sector or a subsidy offered 
by the government to offset its own cheating. However, there are several reasons to believe that 
reputation would be a less effective disciplining force in the environmental arena, relative to the labor 
market. First, the market would be generally thinner, with the number of firms small relative to the 
size of the bonds being posted. Second, the time horizon on environmental bonds would outlast most 
government administrations, encouraging current administrations to discount these reputation effects 
and future administrations to dismiss them as part of the past" 
3.2. Liquidity Constraints 
The second major factor limiting the use of bonds is liquidity constraints. For labor, workers 
often do not possess enough capital or cash to post a bond to secure employment. As noted by 
Dickens eta/. (1989, p. 338), "workers cannot post bonds with liquid assets they do not have." Eaton 
'There is also the potential for firm moral hazard. If the fum realizes its damage exceeds the 
bond, then they have an incentive to shirk. The bond is no longer an effective threat to reduce 
shirking. 
and Wltite (1982) demonstrate that even with perfect capital markets in which the worker could 
borrow the bond, the possibility of worker default still prevents a bond from effectively inducing the 
optimal level of effort. They also show that if workers differ by wealth, then the finn will find it in 
its interest to discriminate, only employing the richest workers. 
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Liquidity constraints also apply to environmental bonds, perhaps even more strictly. When 
confronting potential environmental damages, the costs may well go as high as hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Requiring a finn to post a bond of this magnitude will severely constrain its assets. The 
larger the bond required, the greater the probability that a finn will have insufficient liquid assets to 
deposit up front. If the finn cannot post the bond, then the project might be dropped even though, 
from the ex post social welfare viewpoint, the initiative may be beneficial. In contrast to Costanza and 
Perrings' (1990) argument that bonds are "minimally intrusive into the internal operations of the 
regulated finn" (p. 72), we contend that liquidity constraints will be binding in many instances, 
affecting both the possibility of default and borrowing ability of the finn. 
Costanza and Perrings' (1990) optimism rests on the assumption that capital markets will 
develop so that the finn can risk -pool by insuring against the bond. A possible solution is for 
insurance markets to develop to spread the risk of the firm defaulting on borrowed assets used to post 
the bond. In labor markets, such insurance markets do exist to insure against employee dishonesty 
[see Botnick (1983) for details]. The size of bonds needed for labor relative to those for environmen-
tal issues, however, suggest that insurance markets will bear a significantly higher risk of a major 
multibillion dollar claim. The cost of a policy backing an environmental bond will be significant, 
thereby increasing the possibility of default. 
Default has created a dilemma for insurance finns who have anempted to insure finns from 
environmental litigation. Rich (1985) stresses that recent developments in environmental litigation are 
causing a "wholesale retreat" from the environment liability market Pollution insurance has become 
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increasingly scarce over the past decade due to insurers' inability to properly underwrite environmental 
liability. Rich notes that regulations such as CERCLA create retroactive and nearly absolute liability 
and impose joint and several liability [also see Tietenberg (1989)]. These changes in liability have 
created a climate of such uncertainty that insurance companies are unlikely to respond immediately to 
the call to back environmental bonds. Because litigation costs for CERCLA range from $3.5 to $6.4 
billion for the 1,800 National Priority List sites, insurers will be extremely cautious about liability for 
environmental hazards [see Rich (1985, p. 41)]. 
Other problems with the insurance market include the classic example of adverse selection, 
which exists when those firm who are most likely to forfeit search out the insurer or a banker. A self-
selection bias exists such that the insurer or banker may perceive only untrustworthy firms enter the 
market [see Akerlof (1970)]. Weiss (1990, p. 9) outlines why bankers would be reluctant to give 
loans to finance bonds under adverse selection. A firm wanting to borrow funds for the bond takes 
into account both the market price and the probability of not being caught shirking by the government. 
Bonds financed by the bank encourage firms to enter markets or undertake innovations where the 
probability of successful shirking is low, but the reward for success is high. This arises because the 
firm only fully pays the borrowed bond if successful. Therefore, the firm can reduce its expected cost 
of the bond by entering low success probability markets. Bankers would recognize the firm's 
incentive and would, therefore, not lend funds for the bond. 
If private insurers do not create the market necessary to reduce liquidity constraints, then some 
other institution must be developed. The obvious institution is some form of government insurance 
agency. A firm would then have access to capital to post the bond by borrowing or insuring through 
the government Government insurance institutions, however. have not always been effective. The 
bailout of the savings and loan industry is one recent example. Other possibilities include group 
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coverage or self-insurance schemes, both of which are complex, but potential, institutional frameworks 
to overcome liquidity constraints to environmental bonds [see Faron (1985)]. 
Anotber indirect effect of liquidity is that even if the assets for bonds could be borrowed, the 
firm now has less borrowing capacity for other essential capital. New capital for production or 
research will be restricted if the firm has used a potentially large fraction of borrowing capacity to post 
the bond. This indirect effect will constrain the overall development of the firm, which may not be 
beneficial from a social welfare viewpoint. 
Bohm (1981, p. 125) provides some evidence that liquidity constraints may not be such a 
problem as we have suggested. The Swedish government required Swedish charter companies to post 
a bond of 50,000 SEK (1972 value) to be used to compensate customers in case a trip was unexpect-
edly canceled. Bohm notes that even with the bond the industry more than doubled in size from 57 
firms in 1972 to 130 firms in 1978. Given the relatively small bond and the significant increase in 
leisure demand. the bond was not a barrier to entry. If we are considering firms where tbe potential 
environmental costs are in the multimillions, however, then the bond should pose a more significant 
barrier. We can only speculate at this point, but given the insurance industry's retreat from the 
environmental liability market, such large values may create a significant challenge to the use of bonds 
as an efficient incentive mechanism. 
3.3. Legal Restrictions on Contracts 
A bond is a contract between the firm and the worker or the government and the firm. If the 
contract is breached by shirking or lax pollution control. then the worker or firm will forfeit the bond. 
Given perfect enforcement of the contract, the bond will efficiently achieve the goal of socially 
desirable work effort or pollution control. However. contracts are imperfectly enforced. illegality, 
enforcer sloth, formation defenses, and performance excuses all provide an avenue for the worker or 
firm to challenge the loss of a bond for shirking. The labor literature recognizes tbe limits of bonds 
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due to legal restrictions on contracts. Dickens et a/. (1989) point out that confiscating a bond may be 
viewed by the courts as an unfair penalty. This is especially true if the bond is set high relative to 
damages in order to reduce monitoring expenses. A loss of this bond would be seen as a super-
compensatory damage award. Recognizing that imperfect enforcement is a fact, the worker's cost of 
shirking may seem lower because he/she can challenge the finn's authority to confiscate the bond. 
The incentive of the bond is diminished, thereby limiting its effectiveness in inducing optimal effort 
levels. 
Imperfect contractual enforcement also exists for environmental bonds. If the government 
claims the firm has shirked on pollution control, then the finn has a strong incentive to challenge the 
loss of the bond. We consider two main attacks the finn could use: performance excuses and 
formation defenses. See Posner (1986) or Cooter and Ulen (1988) for complete discussions of 
imperfect enforcement of contracts. 
Suppose a firm has its bond confiscated due to a perceived failure to adequately control 
pollution. The firm could argue that forces or acts of God beyond its control. which were not 
explicitly outlined in the contract, caused their failure. Natural catastrophes, including earthquakes or 
floods, provide a performance excuse for the finn if the terms of the contract are now physically 
impossible to fulfill. The firm may also argue that changes in the environment destroy the purpose of 
the contract. thereby limiting the usefulness of the bond to deter shirking. 
If a performance excuse fails, then the finn can tum to a formation defense. A formation 
defense is used when there are perceived imperfections in the procedures to define the contract. 
Imperfections include incompetence, unilateral or mutual mistake, misrepresentation, and unconsciona-
bility. The firm could challenge the loss of the bond by arguing that the monitoring agency was 
incompetent in forming the value registration of the bond. The accuracy of measures of nonmatket 
values may prove a point of contention if the firm challenges the competence of the investigators 
14 
assigning values. Mistakes or misunderstandings offer the firm an opportunity to recapture their bond. 
If the details of the contract do not specify all contingencies, then the chance increases that the firm 
will successfully argue that it misunderstood ambiguous clauses. Misrepresentation excuses occur if 
the government has withheld information or has misrepresented the damages associated with shirking. 
If the government's objective is to seek rents by setting rents, then overstating damages will force the 
firm to post too large a bond. Finally, if all else fails, the firm could appeal to the doctrine of 
unconscionability. Unconscionability is a vague, shadowy area that steps beyond the traditional 
definitions of duress to include threats. bargaining incompetence. and asymmetric information. 
Legal restrictions due to both performance excuses and formation defenses limit the effective-
ness of environmental bonds. A firm can always challenge the loss of a bond. This gives firms strong 
incentive to allocate resources to a legal war chest to challenge or stall government procedures [see 
Kambhu ( 1990) ]. Resource that could be used more productively will be used in costly legal battles. 
To illustrate the legal costs associated with environmental hazard, we again need only consider 
CERCLA. Rich (1985) estimates litigation costs will exceed S8 billion in battles over liability of 
superfund sites, 79 percent of which will be paid by private firms. Yandle (1988) notes that the 
resources spent on litigation could clear up another 400 superfund sites. The threat of imperfect 
enforcement of a contract can significantly reduce the efficiency of the environmental bond. 
4. SHOULD FARMERS PAY ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS? 
Including the conservation titles in the Food Security Act of 1985 signaled an important 
turning point for agriculture and natural resource policy in the United States. The conservation 
reserve, conservation compliance. sodbuster. and swampbuster provisions tied resource management to 
agriculture commodity titles and significant budget allocations for coordinating agriculture and 
environmental policy. These and related environmental provisions are continued in the Food. 
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Agriculture, Conservation. and Trade Act of 1990 and the current President's Water Quality Initiatives. 
From these initiatives it is clear that future agriculture legislation in the United States will have 
important conservation and environmental content and that these measures will directly and indirectly 
influence the performance of the agricultural sector. In order to better understand the impact of 
coordinating agricultural and environmental policies. we evaluate the implications of using bonds to 
resolve environmental problems associated with agriculture. 
A major form of pollution associated with the agricultural sector is the use of agri-chemicals. 
In the past four decades, government programs have promoted and subsidized increased pesticide and 
nutrient use [see Quigley (1967) and Reichelderfer and Hinkle (1989)]. Between 1964 and 1986. the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture (1985) estimates that pesticide use has tripled. In 1982, more than 90 
percent of U.S. row crop acreage was treated with herbicides. Cbesters and Schierow (1985) estimate 
that about 70 percent of nutrients reaching waterways originate from agricultural lands. 
The other major impacts of agriculture on water arises from erosion and sedimentation. 
Phipps and Crosson (1986) note that the capacity of lakes, irrigation channels and drainage ditches 
have declined due to the deposition of eroded soil. An estimated 1.4 to 1.5 million acre-feet of 
reservoir and lake capacity is permanently filled each year with sediment [Dendy (1986)]. Oarke et 
a/. (1985) contend that the annual costs of off-farm damage from sedimentation, ignoring biological 
effects. ranges from $4.2 billion to $16.9 billion (1985 dollars).' 
Reducing chemical use, erosion, and sedimentation poses significant problems to tbe environ-
mental manager. Are environmental bonds a solution to the agricultural sector's nonpoint source 
pollution problems? Not likely, due to the liquidity constraints that currently exist in the sector. The 
USDA estimates that 21 percent of all farmers already have a debt-to-equity ratio exceeding 40 
'Salinization and waterlogging are also associated with agricultural production. See Young and 
Homer (1986). 
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percent--a ratio considered high enough to cause severe financial stress [see Johnson eta/. (1986)]. 
Hart ( 1986) has noted that financial stress has increased to the extent that the frequency of farm 
foreclosures. forfeitures on land contracts, and defaults on notes have reached levels not seen since the 
Great Depression. In fact, from 1982 to 1986, the U. S. government paid $8 billion to farmers 
through commodity programs, more than 31 percent of net fann income [USDA (1986)]. Because 
producers are already receiving subsidies to maintain fann income, introducing an additional lump sum 
bond payment is probably infeasible. 
In addition, producers often take short-term loans before planting season. The bond will 
require farm operators to trade off loans for current production with loans to finance the bond. Each 
producer has a limit to its borrowing capacity, and imposing an additional constraint from the bond 
may well drive the sma!J operators with limited equity out of business. This can lead to an even more 
concentrated industry. 
The possibility of environmental insurance markets coming into existence as a solution to 
liquidity constraints is low due to the uncertainty involved in the agricultural sector. Because 
producers depend on weather, there is no guarantee that the producer can meet the monthly premiums 
to secure coverage. Therefore, private insurers will be hesitant to enter the market. Although fanners 
may purchase crop insurance, many have not. Because the federal disaster relief payments enacted in 
1988 and 1989, which covered up to $100,000 of losses. other insurance sellers will find few buyers 
[see Kennedy and Visser (1990)]. The government could reverse the insurance so that instead of fann 
disaster, they would insure against environmental disaster from the fann. This would then make the 
government the safety net for damages both to agriculture and from agriculture. 
Another solution to eliminate liquidity constraints is to secure the bond by a lean on the 
nondepreciable assets of the fann. Since there would be no up-front payment. the fanners would not 
be directly bound by their liquid assets. They would be bound, however, by the fact that the value of 
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their nondepreciable assets might not cover the potential environmental damage. This is especially a 
problem in agriculture, since the monitoring and assigning damages will be difficult. Generally, it is 
the cwnulative effect of nwnerous agricultural products that creates environmental problems. The 
nonpoint source nature of agriculture-induced pollution makes it difficult to estimate the effect of an 
individual producer on environmental quality [see Cabe and Herriges (1992)]. Who should be 
punished, if the damage is due to a collective of producers. is an issue that advocates of environmental 
bonds need to address. 
Liquidity constraints are the major factor that reduces the attractiveness of using environmental 
bonds in the agricultural sector. Farmers work from a small profit margin and the requirement that 
they post substantial funds up front will have a significant impact on the sector. Neither private 
bankers nor insurers will step up quickly to offer the financial backing necessary to unbind the 
constraint. This result is similar to the labor problem where workers rarely have the private assets to 
post a performance bond. In the next section, we consider whether the labor literature has other 
alternatives to reducing shirking, and whether these other schemes might work in agriculture. 
5. OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES OFFERED BY THE LABOR LITERATURE 
Faced with the apparent rejection of bonding in real labor markets, the labor literature has 
developed a series of alternatives to bonds. both as theoretical enforcement constructs and as means of 
explaining stylized characteristics of the labor industry (e.g., pensions, hierarchical wage structures. 
and mandatory retirement). Given the parallels between the labor and environmental shirking 
problems, the question naturally arises as to whether market forces in the labor industry have 
developed tools that have a place in environmental management as well. In this section, we explore 
four labor enforcement mechanisms: (a) efficiency wages, (b) increasing wage profiles. (c) trust funds, 
and (d) rank -order tournaments. 
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5.1. Efficiency Wages 
Efficiency wage models have received considerable auention in the labor literature. initially as 
an explanation of involuntary unemployment in developing countries [Liebenstein (1957)] and later as 
a mechanism for firms to reduce worker shirking, to lower turnover rates. and to improve the quality 
and performance of workers.' The concept of efficiency wages is a simple one, based on the notion 
that the level of effort (or efficiency) of the worker will depend upon the real wage he or sbe receives. 
By offering workers a wage in excess of the "market clearing" wage, the firm increases its hourly 
wage costs, but this is offset by the increased productivity of the worker. In the case of Ole, our hired 
hand from the introduction. we increase the chances that our lawn will in fact be mowed by offering 
him $3 an hour instead of $2. The increased wage improves his morale, his attitude towards us as an 
employer and his opportunity costs of shirking.' If he fails to work and is caught, he may only be 
able to find work at the lower wage (i.e., in the "secondary market"). 
Efficiency wages are not new to environmental economics. but rather than taking the form of 
an implicit contract. they have been developed as an explicit contract in the form of Pigouvian 
subsidies. 8 Firms that shirk, by damaging the environment. are forced into a secondary market where 
'The literature on efficiency wages is extensive. including Akerlof (1982,1984), Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984), Calvo and Wellisz (1979), Malcolmson (1984) and Salop (1979). Reviews of the 
literature can be found in Akerlof and Yellen (1986), Yellen (1984), Weiss (1990) and Parsons (1986). 
See Lindbeck and Snower (1988) for an alternative view. 
'There are several reasons for this linkage between wages and worker productivity. which Weiss 
{ 1990) categorizes into direct and indirect effects. The direct effects arise due to the impact of real 
wages on the health of the worker [Liebenstein (1957)]. Ole will not, or cannot. work hard if our $2 
wage does not provide for a sufficient level of nutrition and health care. Indirect effects can arise due 
to the impact that wages can have on the worker's sense of morale and finn loyalty. Akerlof (1982, 
1984 ), for example, explains efficiency wages as a partial gift exchange between the worker and the 
firm, with the firm providing higher wages in exchange for the worker's gift of loyalty and effort in 
excess of minimum effort levels. 
'Klein and Leffler (1981) identify a "price premium" that could be used as a means of 
guaranteeing contractual performance. This premium is to compensate the buyer or seller who invests 
in capital that is specific to a transaction. For example. utilities invest in coal-fired generators that 
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they earn only the market rate of return on their investments. In this context. Pigouvian taxes can be 
thought of as a negative efficiency wage. In the labor field. this would correspond with paying 
individuals their marginal value product in the primary industry, but having the ability to gamer a 
portion of their wages should they quit and become employed in the secondary labor market. Finally, 
implicit efficiency wages, similar to Akerlofs (1982, 1984) "gift exchange," may also exist in the 
environmental arena, with the firm tacitly exchanging additional effort in pollution control for 
government leniency regarding pollution control standards at a future date.' 
In agriculture, commodity and price supports could be considered an efficiency wage. If price 
supports were coupled with environmental performance. then shirking could result in a significant 
penalty. The total level of support for a crop is determined mainly by the target price--the minimum 
income support on all eligible production. The farmer receives a deficiency payment that equals the 
difference between the target price and the average market price (or loan rate). Loss of this income 
support could be used as a penalty due to shirking on environmental protection. This penalty, in fact. 
exists with the enacunent of the 1985 Food Security Act. Both the sodbuster (producing on highly 
erodible land) and the swampbuster (converting wetlands to farm use) provisions specify the penalty of 
shirking as denied access to government programs. including price and income supports. With the 
current President's 1990 Water Quality Initiative, this penalty could be extended beyond erosion and 
wetlands to also include water contamination by agri-chemical use. 
require a specific coal for maximum thermal efficiency [Kerkvliet and Shogren (1992)]. Whether this 
price premium could be used on a sustained basis to make environmental-specific technology more 
attractive is open for debate. 
'While verification of such tacit agreements is difficult. explicit versions of this type of gift 
exchange can be seen in the Oean Air Act Amendments of the 1990. For example. firms that reduce 
toxic air pollution emission early, by 90 percent or more. are given six additional years to meet the 
corresponding MACf standards [Wegman (1991)]. 
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5.2. Increasing Wage Profiles 
Lazear (1979, 1981) provides an alternative to assurance bonds that avoids the liquidity 
constraint problem, while retaining an incentive for workers to abstain from shirking. Under 
increasing (or life cycle) wage profiles. workers are initially paid less than their value marginal 
product (VMP). This deficiency is made up over time as the worker's wage is gradually increased to 
beyond their VMP. As noted by Carmichael (1989), this is essentially an installment plan version of 
assurance bonding. Early in their careers, workers contribute to a fund that will later return them 
wages beyond their VMP. They are reluctant to shirk during their careers, for fear of losing this 
investment In return, firms can offer wage streams with high discounted present value due to the 
increase in productivity. 
The environmental counterpart to an increasing wage profile would involve a combination of 
taxes and subsidies. Firms would initially pay taxes into an environmental incentive fund. Over a 
fixed time period, these taxes would be gradually converted into a subsidy, paying the firm back the 
fund's principal and interest. Unfortunately, while this mechanism provides firms with some incentive 
to avoid shirking, it will not be completely effective. As pointed out by Akerlof and Katz (1989) in 
the labor context, workers will have greater incentive to shirk early on in their careers. when their 
contributions to the installment bond fund have been small. and hence the cost of shirking and being 
caught is small. In fact, Akerlof and Katz (1989) demonstrate that the wage profiles concept will only 
work if they take the extreme form of a trust fund, with workers paid a flat wage during their entire 
career, with a guaranteed bonus or pension upon retirement. This leads naturally to the consideration 
of labor, and environmental, trusts. 
5.3. Trust Funds 
One solution to the liquidity constraint problem in the labor market is to have the firm post the 
assurance bond, rather than the worker. In essence. this vests the initial "property right" of shirking to 
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the worker, rather than with the firms. It is not surprising then to find that Akerlof and Katz's (1989) 
optimal trust equals v/p when workers are risk neutral and the discount rate is zero. 10 This is exactly 
size of the optimal up-front bond. The initial costs have just been transferred to the finn. In a like 
manner, government agencies could encourage pollution abatement efforts by establishing environmen-
tal trusts for existing firms. If damages occur prior to a specified time period, the trust would be 
drawn down to cover these costs. At the end of the period, the firms could claim the remainder of the 
trust. Finns would have an incentive to avoid environmental damages in order to maintain the value 
of the trust, just as they would with an up-front bond. Again, the cross-compliance provisions in 
recent farm bills can be viewed as short-term trusts. Farmers are given access to commodity programs 
if they meet specified environmental constraints. One limit to the trust approach, of course, is that 
governments also face liquidity, or at least budget, constraints. In addition, there is the risk that the 
practice of establishing environmental trusts would encourage new firms to enter an industry and 
exaggerate their potential for damage to the environment. just to gain access to the trust system. 11 
5.4. Rank-Order Tournaments 
While both wage profiles and trust funds provide alternatives to assurance bonding that reduce 
the liquidity constraint problem, neither addresses the moral hazard problem of the principal in this 
principal-agent problem. In the case of increasing wage profiles, the finn would have an incentive to 
falsely claim malfeasance once the worker's wage exceeded his marginal value product, whereas he 
would wait until just before retirement under a trust system. Similar problems would arise in the 
application of these policy tools to environmental management 
"'Recall that v equals the value of the disutility of effort and p denotes the probability of being 
caught shirking. 
•~'-"" 
11A similar argument has been raised against the use of subsidies, versus taxes, in controlling 
pollution problems. See, for example. Downing (1984. p. 181). 
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Rank-order tournaments, initially developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981), avoid the principal's 
moral hazard problem by precommitting her to a fixed budget outlay. The multiple agents are 
discouraged from shirking by tying the total reward to their final performance ranking. For example, 
in a single-period labor market model, firms would commit to paying a fixed percentage (P) of the 
workers a high wage (W), while the remaining workers would receive a lower wage (w). The firm is 
assumed to be able to observe each worker's productivity ortly with error.12 They have an incentive 
to award the higher wage to the most productive workers io order to encourage production. with no 
associate incentive to cheat, since it would not alter their total wage bill. Workers are encouraged to 
work in order to receive the higher wage." The level of shirking is controlled by altering the spread 
between W and w and the probability of "promotion" to the high wage. The risk is, of course, that 
the workers will collude, providing a lower level of overall output for the same level of compensation. 
This risk is perhaps greater in environmental management problems, due to the thinness of the market, 
than in labor markets, where the number of workers can reduce the opportunities for collusion. 
In the environmental arena, the rank -order tournament is similar in nature to Xepapadeas' 
(1991) random penalty (or reward) mechanism. In the latter case, the regulatory agency randomly 
penalizes a firm or subset of firms in a region if pollution levels exceed its chosen standard. The 
individual finn has an incentive to reduce its pollution level in order to reduce the overall pollution 
level and avoid the chance that it will be selected for the penalty. The random assignment of the 
penalty avoids the need for the regulator to monitor firms individually. The rank-order tournament, in 
contrast. does require some firm-specific monitoring, in order to conduct the ranking. However. it 
''Typically, this error is assumed to have two parts, one worker-specific and the other common to 
all workers. These would have natural counterparts in an environmental setting, with the individual 
error corresponding to unobserved firm specific effort (or shirking) and the joint error corresponding 
with random environmental events. such as weather, that influence the overall level of environmental 
damage. 
"Note here that rank-order tournaments are a rank trust 
replaces the uncertainty of the random penalty with the firm's own uncertainty regarding its relative 
position in the industry. Additional research is needed to compare the relative merits of these two 
enforcement mechanisms. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
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Our purpose has been to consider the use of environmental bonds, while considering the 
lessons from the labor literature. While limits such as government moral hazard, liquidity constraints, 
and legal restrictions pose a challenge to bonds, labor economists have proposed several useful 
alternatives including efficiency wages, increasing wage proftles, trusts, and rank-order tournaments. 
More effort needs to be devoted to understanding how these alternative incentive mechanisms can be 
translated into environmental management tools. We offer only the basic structure in this paper. Our 
next step is to develop the analytical framework to systematically evaluate the applicability of these 
tools for improved environmental policy. 
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